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From the Civil War up to the Smoot-Hawley tariff of  1930, Congress retained 
exclusive authority over U.S. tariffs, which for the most part consisted of  a 
single-column schedule of  nonnegotiable, nondiscriminatory import duties. 
Politicians fought over the height of those duties-the  Republicans enacted 
high protective tariffs (such as Smoot-Hawley) when they were in power, and 
the Democrats enacted more moderate tariffs when they were in power-but 
not over the authority of Congress in setting those duties. 
Following their electoral sweep in 1932, the Democrats undertook an inno- 
vation in trade policy making by passing the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
(RTAA) of  1934. By this legislation, Congress granted the president the au- 
thority to reach tariff reduction agreements-agreements  that did not require 
congressional approval-with  foreign countries. Republicans opposed this 
delegation of tariff-making power to the president and for several years threat- 
ened to repeal the RTAA. By the late 1940s, however, Republicans generally 
accepted the status quo of  (qualified) executive authority over tariffs, which 
had fallen from over 50 percent in the early 1930s to about  13 percent. Al- 
though Republicans succeeded in halting further trade liberalization through 
the 1950s, the trade agreements program survived and is the basis for current 
U.S. commercial policy. 
Did the Great Depression bring about this fundamental shift in the conduct 
of  U.S. trade policy? Or was it a natural outcome of an underlying movement 
toward the delegation of trade policy-making powers to the executive that is 
evident in earlier years? Were the trade agreements that resulted from this dele- 
gation of authority responsible for the substantial reduction in the average U.S. 
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tariff? Why did the Republicans change their position and not kill the RTAA 
when they had the chance in 1946? This paper argues that neither political 
party  showed a serious inclination to alter the mechanism of  congressional 
tariff making until the early 1930s. To judge from the previous historical pat- 
tern, the Democratic response to the Smoot-Hawley tariff should have been to 
repeal it and enact an additional unilateral tariff reduction. This option was 
considered but was rejected. 
What was different about the early 1930s, and what brought about the dele- 
gation of powers to the executive instead, was not so much the Great Depres- 
sion in the United States per se, this paper argues, but the depression as an 
international phenomenon. The U.S. depression did foreclose a unilateral tariff 
reduction as a political option in the short run but did not necessitate delega- 
tion. Rather, the economic collapse in Europe and elsewhere led to a dramatic 
rise in foreign trade barriers and discriminatory measures against U.S.  goods. 
This feature of the international economic environment demanded a response 
different from the autonomously determined tariffs of previous decades. The 
Democrats saw reciprocal trade agreements as accomplishing several objec- 
tives: they would moderate the tariff code to their liking, make reversal of those 
lower tariffs difficult should they lose power, and promote economic recovery 
by reducing foreign tariffs on U.S. exports. 
Furthermore, it was not the Great Depression but the changed U.S. eco- 
nomic position in the world after World War I1 that blunted Republican opposi- 
tion to the RTAA and ensured its survival. After the war, export-oriented eco- 
nomic interests-manufacturers  and labor in particular-stood  to benefit from 
an open trade regime and supported the RTAA. As a result, Republicans no 
longer argued for repeal of the RTAA as much as for making trade agreements 
conditional on congressional approval and inclusive of an “escape clause” pro- 
vision to protect domestic interests harmed by  imports. The nascent postwar 
consensus about America’s global leadership responsibilities forced Republi- 
cans into accepting the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
1947 as a necessary component of Europe’s economic recovery and America’s 
national security. Thus, while the Great Depression as an international phe- 
nomenon helped determine the mechanism (reciprocal trade agreements rather 
than unilateral action) by which the Democrats reduced tariffs, the U.S. global 
economic position after World War I1 ensured that the Republicans would not 
reverse the tariff reductions once they achieved power. 
The RTAA radically changed the process of U.S.  trade policy making, but 
it actually had a relatively minor effect on the height of U.S. tariffs. The United 
States experienced major swings in the average ad valorem tariff (tariff revenue 
as a share of dutiable imports) during this period-from  40 percent in 1929 to 
59 percent in 1932 to 14 percent in 1948, as illustrated in figure 10.1. These 
swings were produced less by conscious policy decisions to change tariff rates 
than by import price fluctuations acting on specific duties, which were levied 
on about two-thirds of dutiable imports and whose ad valorem equivalent was 
inversely related to prices. The dramatic escalation of the tariff during 1929-32 327  From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
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Fig. 10.1  Average ad valorem U.S. tariff rate, 1900-1955 
Source: U.S.  Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Historical Sfatistics  of the 
United States, from Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975). 
was due more to plunging import prices than to higher Smoot-Hawley tariff 
rates; the subsequent drop in the tariff was overwhelmingly due to higher im- 
port prices rather than reciprocal trade agreements with other countries. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 10.1 sets out the historical pat- 
tern of  congressional tariff making in the 40 years prior to the depression, 
along with the very minor institutional tinkering that took place. Section 10.2 
discusses the Smoot-Hawley tariff of  1930 and its relationship to U.S. trade 
during the Great Depression. Section 10.3 examines why the newly elected 
Democrats opted for the RTAA in 1934 and how the RTAA was implemented. 
Section 10.4 focuses on the continuation of the trade agreements program into 
the postwar period, the waning Republican opposition to the RTAA, and the 
emergence of a bipartisan consensus in favor of  the new status quo. Section 
10.5 asks whether the Great Depression constituted a defining moment for US. 
trade policy and summarizes the paper's main conclusions. 
10.1  Tinkering with Tariffs, 1890-1930 
In the decades after the Civil War, the tariff served two primary purposes: 
it raised revenue for the federal government and protected certain domestic 
industries from import competition. The two political parties differed in the 328  Douglas A. Irwin 
emphasis they put on these objectives. The Republicans, drawing their support 
from manufacturers in the Northeast and Midwest, advocated a high protective 
tariff. They argued that such tariffs preserved the home market for domestic 
producers and secured high domestic wages for labor by making foreign pro- 
ducers pay for their market access. The Democrats, drawing their support from 
farmers in the South, believed the tariff should be designed mainly for revenue 
purposes with moderate protection given to import-competing interests. They 
womed that too high a tariff might foster monopolies and excessively burden 
consumers. Progressive Republicans, often in a coalition with the Democrats, 
agreed that the tariff should be protective but also wanted to reform the tariff 
system to reduce its inequities and limit its costs to c0nsumers.l 
The tariff ranked among the most important political issues in the post bel- 
lum United States. In the half-century after the Civil War, however, Republi- 
cans completely dominated Congress and the executive branch. As a result, 
U.S. tariff rates remained high. From 1867 to 1912, Democrats controlled both 
houses of  Congress and the presidency for just one brief period (1893-95), 
during which time they passed the Dingley tariff of  1894, which marginally 
reduced tariff rates. Less than three years later, the Republicans regained power 
and pushed tariffs back up again. 
In 1913 the Democrats regained control of Congress and the presidency and 
promptly passed the Underwood tariff, the first thoroughgoing downward revi- 
sion in import duties since the Civil War. Yet this effort was cut short by  the 
outbreak of World War I, when special emergency controls on trade were im- 
posed, and then reversed by the Republicans after the war. Thus, in the brief 
periods in which they controlled both Congress and the presidency, the Demo- 
crats reduced import tariffs (1894,1913). When the Republicans regained con- 
trol of government, they promptly raised import tariffs (1  897, 1922), and they 
revised or raised them at other times as well (1883, 1890, 1909, 1930).’ 
Throughout this period, the focal point of  U.S. tariff setting was the Con- 
gress, which derived its powers from Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution 
giving it the power to impose and collect import duties and “to regulate Com- 
merce with foreign Nations.” For most of  this period, the tariff code was  a 
single-column list of import duties. Congress treated the determination of im- 
port duties on hundreds of individual products as an exclusively domestic con- 
cern within its own province. For standard collective action reasons, domestic 
interests seeking high tariffs for protection against import competition domi- 
nated the process by which Congress set the duties, while export interests and 
consumers were underrepresented in the political process. 
In serving domestic (special) economic interests, Congress’s tariff was set 
I. As Kenkel put it, “Like the farmers and small-scale manufacturers whom they represented, 
the middle-westem [Republican progressive] congressmen believed in the principle [of protection] 
but condemned its application by party leaders who, they charged, responded to the demands of 
the giant enterprises” (1983, 3). 
2. Taussig (1931) remains the classic reference on U.S. tariff history during this period. 329  From Smoot-Hawley  to Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
independently of (and generally without regard for) the tariff policies of other 
countries. Congress was not the best forum in which the foreign policy ramifi- 
cations of  trade policy were given due consideration. The president, whose 
national constituency and foreign policy responsibilities might be expected to 
moderate any tariff produced by Congress, was often a minor actor in the tariff- 
setting exercise. The president could, in principle, negotiate lower U.S. tariffs 
in conjunction with other countries, but in practice he could not because any 
tariff treaty would require the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. 
There were some pressures to change this otherwise smoothly functioning 
process of  congressional tariff making. An  ever expanding list of  imported 
goods complicated the task of gathering and processing information on trade 
matters. Tariff legislation became lengthier and increasingly time con~uming.~ 
The end result also left many dissatisfied. Aggrieved interests complained that 
Congress was not getting or acting on the right information. Business groups 
such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufac- 
turers did not want to end protection but wanted to “take the tariff out of poli- 
tics” and place it on a more impartial, rational footing, less subject to the 
whims of special interest politics. Export interests complained that the system 
was too rigid, not allowing for lower tariffs on intermediate goods or for recip- 
rocal bargaining to reduce foreign barriers against U.S.  exports. To hold off 
tariff-reform-minded  progressives  who  complained  that  the  tariff  merely 
served the interests of big business, Republicans spoke of developing a “scien- 
tific” tariff-that  is, one based on certain principles and not one that just re- 
flected special interest coalitions. 
Were these pressures pushing the Congress to delegate some powers  or 
adopt some form of reciprocal trade agreements policy in the decades prior to 
the Great Depression? During this period the political parties in Congress did 
struggle with two key issues dealing with the process of tariff making: (1) how 
to improve or reform the system of formulating the tariff and (2) how to enable 
the president to achieve reciprocity (equal market access abroad) in the face of 
foreign discrimination. But a brief examination of each issue reveals that there 
was no movement toward RTAA-type legislation prior to the early 1930s. 
10.1.1  The Tariff Commission Movement 
Despite the use of independent regulatory commissions in other economic 
matters, Congress proved reluctant to relinquish its control over the tariff to 
any other body. Progressive Republicans championed the cause of an indepen- 
dent tariff commission as a move toward a less political tariff, but most Repub- 
licans and Democrats questioned the desirability of  such a move. Congress 
resisted not just the delegation of tariff-making powers to a separate agency 
3. Schattschneider  (1935, 23) shows that pre-Civil  War tariff legislation  ran fewer than 20 
pages, reached about 100  pages by the turn of the century, and amounted to 200 pages with Smoot- 
Hawley. Tariff bills typically took 6 to 12 months to get through Congress around the turn of  the 
century, but it took over 18 months in the case of Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley. 330  Douglas A. Irwin 
but even any reliance on such an agency to provide impartial advice about the 
tariff or simply unbiased information about conditions in trade and industry. 
This opposition was based on the following consideration: If  an independent 
tariff agency was to do more than just collect data and was to actually give 
advice on the proper height of tariffs, it would need a criterion by  which to 
determine whether a tariff was too high or too low. The two political parties 
differed fundamentally as to what the guiding principle in setting tariffs should 
be. Each party feared that the agency could become stacked with members 
from the other party or have as its mandate an objectionable criterion for set- 
ting tariffs. Furthermore, why bother setting up such an agency when Congress 
could not commit itself to adhere to a commission’s advice? 
Nevertheless, some experimentation did take place. In the early  188Os, a 
Republican Congress created a temporary tariff commission to gather business 
views on the tariff. Although its report was essentially ignored, the commission 
made a suggestion that Republicans later embraced: the tariff should be de- 
signed to equalize the costs of production between domestic and foreign pro- 
ducers. Advocates of this “scientific” tariff reasoned as follows: because wages 
in the United States exceeded those abroad, U.S. production costs were higher 
than foreign costs, and therefore a tariff to equalize these costs would permit 
domestic and foreign producers to compete on an equal footing, thereby keep- 
ing U.S. wages high. How such a calculation could be done for the thousands 
of  items in the tariff code and the dozens of countries from which products 
came was never worked out. Democrats heatedly denied that this “scientific” 
principle of tariff design had any merit. 
In 1909 President Taft set up a tariff board (an executive advisory group, not 
a creature of Congress) to provide advice on tariff reform. Democrats vocifer- 
ously opposed creating any permanent tariff bureaucracy on the grounds that 
it would entrench the system around a bad principle-that  of setting tariffs to 
equalize differences in the costs of production of domestic and foreign produc- 
ers. Congressional Republicans were also suspicious of presidential meddling 
with the tariff. The board went defunct in 1912. 
Content with the tariff reductions enacted in  1913, President Wilson and 
many congressional Democrats continued to oppose the creation of  a tariff 
commission. But Wilson was eventually persuaded by  some cabinet members 
(and the advice of Harvard economics professor Frank Taussig, who was ap- 
pointed the first chairman of the Tariff Commission) that an independent, non- 
partisan, fact-finding agency could provide useful information on trade condi- 
tions  at  home  and  abroad,  particularly  given  the  wartime  disruptions  to 
commerce. Rep. Oscar Underwood (D-Ala.) saw such an agency as a threat to 
the low tariffs he had ushered through Congress in 1913, but his resolution to 
stop the proposal was defeated by a vote of 55-5  (all opposing votes were cast 
by Democrats). 
Title VII of the Revenue Act of 1916 established the U.S. Tariff Commission 
(USTC). The USTC was created only to provide objective information to the 331  From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Congress about trade matters, and no delegation of  congressional authority 
was involved. Composed of  six members (no more than half from a single 
political party), the USTC would not be involved in recommending particular 
tariff rates, and hence, there was no provision for how the tariff should be set. 
During its first five years in operation (1917-22),  the USTC produced several 
reports on trade policy and made recommendations on mundane administrative 
details (such as improving the tariff classification schedule). 
Latent Democratic fears about the potential misuse of the USTC were con- 
firmed when the Republicans got their next shot at writing tariff legislation. A 
long-standing concern about the tariff code was that it was too rigid in the face 
of changing trade conditions. Section 315 of the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 
1922 introduced the “flexible” tariff provision, which authorized the president 
to increase or decrease a tariff rate by  as much as 50 percent whenever he 
determined, after investigation by the USTC, that such a change was necessary 
to equalize differences in the cost of production between the United States and 
foreign countries. Although this provision was hardly ever employed over the 
course of  the 1920s, when it was used it resulted more frequently in higher 
than in lower import d~ties.~  Democrats were dismayed by the introduction of 
the costs-of-production principle as a bureaucratic objective and by the opera- 
tion of the flexible tariff provision.s 
To conclude briefly, up to the Great Depression the Congress never seriously 
considered delegating its tariff-making powers to another agency. 
10.1.2  Tariff Bargaining by the Executive 
As a practical matter, the congressionally set tariff proved to be nonnegotia- 
ble. Under his foreign policy powers, the president could always negotiate a 
tariff reduction treaty with another country. However, the measure would not 
just require the approval of two-thirds of  the  Senate but implicitly require 
House approval as well because it would involve a revenue matter. Knowing 
that  the executive could  not commit to  the implementation of  any  signed 
agreement,  foreign  countries  were  reluctant  to  negotiate with  the  United 
States. Just three major trade agreements-with  Canada (1855-66),  Hawaii 
(1876-1900),  and Cuba (1903-34)-were  enacted during this period. 
The Tariff Act of  1897 was the first to authorize the president (within two 
years)  to  reduce  certain  import  duties  (by  no  more  than  20  percent,  in 
agreements lasting no more than five years) in conjunction with countries giv- 
ing equivalent tariff concessions. Any agreement would still require the ap- 
4. During  1922-29, the USTC conducted some 80 investigations and issued some 40 reports. 
The president raised import duties in 33 of 38 cases. The duty reductions were on such commodi- 
ties as phenol, live bobwhite quails, cresylic acid, and paintbrush handles. See Kelley (1963, 22). 
5. In drafting the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, Democrats and progressive Republicans formed 
a coalition to  wrest control of  the  flexible tariff from the  executive branch and return it  to the 
Congress. President Hoover threatened to veto any tariff bill with that provision, and in the end 
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proval of both the House and Senate, but by explicitly inviting such agreements 
Congress implied that it would approve them, even promising to consider any 
agreement without amendment. 
As the qualifications suggest, however, the invitation for the president to 
undertake negotiations was rather tepid and  carefully circumscribed. Con- 
gress’s endorsement of reciprocity ultimately proved empty because treaty op- 
ponents ensured that not one of the eleven negotiated agreements even came 
up for a vote. Furthermore, the tariff act in which this provision appeared was 
apparently set up as a classic bargaining duty: tariff rates were set 20 percent 
higher than otherwise to take into account their later reduction under presiden- 
tial agreements, according to the USTC (1919, 202-3).  In the end, the United 
States had a high bargaining tariff without having approved any of  the bar- 
gains. The Tariff Act of  1913 also had a provision authorizing the president to 
undertake tariff negotiations, but no agreements were negotiated. 
Congress more frequently embraced a different kind of reciprocity, one to 
eliminate foreign discrimination against U.S. goods by  imposing penalties 
rather than offering concessions. The McKinley tariff of  1890, for example, 
authorized the president to impose penalty duties on the importation of sugar, 
molasses, coffee, tea, and hides from foreign countries that had “unequal and 
unreasonable” tariffs on U.S. goods. Reciprocity here was not the mutual re- 
duction of  tariffs but the elimination of  foreign discrimination. It was to be 
achieved not with the carrot of bargaining but with the stick of retaliation. 
In  1909, Congress shifted gears  and  passed  a two-column, “maximum- 
minimum” tariff schedule. The maximum schedule was designated as the gen- 
eral tariff, but if the president determined that another country’s policies did 
not “unduly” discriminate against U.S. products, he could apply the minimum 
schedule to that country’s goods. In this instance, the president rendered the 
maximum schedule moot by determining that no foreign country “unduly” dis- 
criminated against the United States. 
All  of  these measures, however,  amounted to half-hearted tinkering and 
proved to be short lived. The penalty duties in the McKinley tariff of 1890 were 
abolished by the Democratic tariff of  1894, reinstituted by the Republicans in 
1897, abolished by the Democrats once again in 19  13, and not reintroduced by 
the Republicans in 1922. The 1897 invitation for the president to bargain was 
absent in the  1909 law, reappeared again in  1913, but was left out of  both 
the 1922 and 1930 tariff acts. Before 1922 “the United States tariff, although 
negotiable in principle, had not been very negotiable in fact,” writes Kelley 
(1963, 27): “After 1922, even the principle of  negotiability was discarded.” A 
Republican scientific tariff based on the equalization of  costs of  production 
could not be reconciled with a tariff that could be arbitrarily bargained away. 
Congress’s tight reins on tariff making also constrained the president from 
exercising greater international economic leadership in the interwar period. 
Although encouraging freer, nondiscriminatory trade policies was one of Presi- 
dent Wilson’s Fourteen Points promulgated after World War I, he was unable 333  From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
to follow through with any substantive effort in this direction. At international 
economic gatherings through the 192Os, particularly the 1927  World Economic 
Conference, the State Department could offer platitudes but not concrete pro- 
posals. 
Two unheralded but key changes took place during this period that would 
have important implications for the future course of  U.S. trade policy. First, 
the income tax, which the Democrats had consistently linked to tariff reform, 
dramatically reduced the dependence of the federal government on revenues 
from import duties after 1916. Tariffs generated over 90 percent of  federal 
revenue prior to the Civil War, about 50 percent from 1870-1910,  but only 
about 10 percent of federal revenue in the 1920s. The tariff was now free to be 
set with objectives other than revenue in mind. 
Second, with almost no fanfare the United States announced in 1923 that it 
would adopt an unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) policy. Up to that 
point, the United States had adhered to a conditional MFN policy, in which 
U.S. tariff concessions to one country would not be extended to others unless 
a reciprocal reduction was offered. Under an unconditional MFN policy, any 
negotiated U.S. tariff reduction would be automatically applied to all countries 
that had an MFN treaty with the United States. The 1923 decision formalized 
the U.S. commitment to nondiscrimination as a ruling principle in international 
commerce. At the time this was a minor change in the administration of trade 
policy. “Because the United States conditional MFN policy resulted in rela- 
tively little discrimination,” Kelley notes, “the adoption of  an unconditional 
MFN policy in 1923 would not be of such major significance had the United 
States tariff continued to be virtually non-negotiable” (1963, 35). Because the 
Republicans did not anticipate any major tariff  negotiations they willingly 
adopted a policy that became the cornerstone of such negotiations. 
The following should now be clear: right up to the Smoot-Hawley tariff, 
Congress was reluctant to delegate any of its tariff-making powers either to an 
independent agency in order to obtain better information or to the executive in 
order to reach reciprocal tariff reduction agreements. 
10.2  Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression 
The Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 has been popularly portrayed as an aberra- 
tion, an  atrocious piece of tariff legislation whose extremity reflects special 
interest logrolling run amok. Taking the previous half-century into one’s per- 
spective, however, suggests that Smoot-Hawley was not that much out of the 
ordinary. Indeed, Smoot-Hawley fits in well with the pre-World  War I pattern 
of Republican control of the tariff described above. 
Once the Republicans regained control of Congress and the presidency in 
the 1920 election, they promptly raised tariffs. Following the Emergency Tariff 
Act of  192  1, the Fordney-McCumber tariff of  1922 formalized and extended 
the sharp increase in import duties: Republicans aimed not just to reverse the 334  Douglas A. Irwin 
Democratic tariff reduction of 1913 but to raise rates further to insulate domes- 
tic industries from postwar competition from Europe. As firms lined up with 
complaints about import competition and requests for higher tariffs, Rep. Jo- 
seph Fordney (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, 
reportedly stated that it was his duty to “give the boys what they wanted” 
(quoted in Kenkel 1983, 152). Partly as a result, the average tariff (shown in 
fig. 10.1) returned to where it had been just prior to the war but still below 
where it had been around the turn of the century. 
In view of the increasing economic difficulties that afflicted agriculture dur- 
ing the 1920s, it was not unnatural for the Republicans to call for another up- 
ward revision of the tariff during the election campaign of  1928. (Recall that 
several times previously the Republicans had revised their own tariff.) Having 
secured the presidency once again with even greater congressional majorities, 
Republicans began work  on the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill in January  1929. 
When it achieved final passage 18 months later, the vote was predictably parti- 
san: in the House, 92 percent of Republicans favored the measure, and 91 per- 
cent of Democrats opposed it; in the Senate, 78 percent of Republicans favored 
the bill, and 86 percent of Democrats opposed it. 
The Smoot-Hawley tariff was not particularly unusual in the degree to which 
it raised import duties. According to the USTC, had Smoot-Hawley tariff rates 
been applied to actual imports observed in 1928, the tariff would have pushed 
the average ad valorem equivalent rate of duty from 34.6 percent (under the 
Fordney-McCumber tariff) to 42.5 percent, an increase of about 23 percent. 
This was not as significant a tariff increase as Fordney-McCumber, which the 
USTC suggested (in a similar fixed import weight calculation) pushed the aver- 
age tariff rate up 64 percent from the Democratic Underwood tariff of  1913 
(see Irwin 1998). Smoot-Hawley helped boost the average tariff to where it 
had been around the turn of the century. 
Yet  Smoot-Hawley was unique on several dimensions. The legislation took 
much longer (from January 1929 to June 1930) to go from House Ways  and 
Means Committee hearings to final congressional passage than most previous 
tariff legislation. At almost 200 pages the bill was significantly longer, more 
complex, and  more  controversial than  its predecessors. President Hoover’s 
promise of  “limited tariff revision” to help farmers was compromised by the 
bill, which overhauled the entire tariff and included much higher duties for 
manufacturers as well. Public opposition to the bill was much more vocal than 
to previous tariff acts either because special interest logrolling was more bla- 
tant or because there was greater sensitivity to such logrolling.6  Taussig (1931, 
499) speaks of Hoover’s being “besieged” by requests to veto the bill as farm- 
ers objected, newspaper editorialists moaned, foreign governments protested, 
6. Schattschneider (1935) remains the classic reference on the politics of the Smoot-Hawley 
tariff. See also Irwin and Kroszner (1996) for an analysis of logrolling in Senate roll call votes on 
individual tariffs, and Callahan, McDonald, and O’Brien (1994) for  an analysis of  factors de- 
termining the final congressional votes. Eichengreen (1989) provides an excellent general discus- 
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and 1,028 economists signed a petition urging the president not to sign the leg- 
islation. 
The Smoot-Hawley tariff was not a response to the Great Depression: prepa- 
ration for tariff revision began in late 1928 in reaction to the severe economic 
distress faced by  farmers, well before the stock market crash or the slide in 
aggregate output and employment. Instead, Smoot-Hawley became infamous 
as a result of  the economic catastrophes that occurred in its wake. Smoot- 
Hawley was later blamed for the 40 percent plunge in the volume of U.S.  trade 
in the two years after its imposition, for poisoning international trade relations 
by triggering a wave of foreign tariffs that put world commerce on a downward 
spiral, and even for turning a modest recession into the Great Depression. 
The Smoot-Hawley tariff, however, was almost surely not responsible for 
causing the Great Depression. There are no strong theoretical or empirical 
grounds for maintaining that higher average tariffs led to business cycle down- 
turns; the larger Fordney-McCumber tariff increase, for example, was followed 
by an economic recovery.’ Pushing up the average tariff from 40 percent to 47 
percent, as in the case of  Smoot-Hawley, we shall see, resulted in just a 5-6 
percent increase in the relative price of imports at a time when imports were 
only 4 percent of GNP. It is not even clear whether the tariff exacerbated or 
ameliorated the  depression. Two  studies of  the  macroeconomic effects of 
Smoot-Hawley differ as to the direction of the effect, although they arrive at 
comparable magnitudes-which  are small relative to the depression itself. 
Crucini and Kahn (1996) argue that tariff-induced distortions to capital accu- 
mulation and foreign retaliation could have brought about a 2 percent decline 
in U.S.  GNP, while Eichengreen (1989) argues that the Keynesian-type stimu- 
lus from Smoot-Hawley dominated any foreign retaliation and could have in- 
creased GNP by about 2 percent. 
If  Smoot-Hawley did not play a major role in promoting or inhibiting the 
Great Depression, it bears part of the responsibility for the collapse of trade in 
the early 1930s. Even here, however, Irwin (1998) finds that declining income 
rather than the higher tariff accounts for most of the observed 40 percent fall 
in import volume between 1930 and 1932. The volume of imports fell 15 per- 
cent, for example, in the year prior to the imposition of  the Smoot-Hawley 
tariff, a period when real GNP fell 7 percent. But the depression exacerbated 
the impact of the tariff through an unusual mechanism: the ad valorem equiva- 
lent of  specific duties, which were levied on roughly two-thirds of  dutiable 
imports, rose during periods of deflation. The 50 percent fall in import prices 
between 1929 and 1932, therefore, dramatically raised the real effective tariff.8 
In fact, the deflation-induced increase in the tariff exceeded that of the Smoot- 
7. Dornbusch and Fischer write in the context of Smoot-Hawley that “from either a Keynesian 
or a monetarist perspective, the tariff by  itself would have been an expansionary impulse in the 
absence of retaliation. In the Keynesian view, the reduction in imports diverts demand to domestic 
goods; in the monetarist view the gold inflow increases the domestic money stock if not sterilized” 
(1986,468-69). 
8. On this point see Crucini (1994) and Irwin (1996). 336  Douglas A. Irwin 
Hawley legislation: Congress pushed up duties about 20 percent, from 40 per- 
cent to 47  percent average ad  valorem during 1929-30,  while deflation in- 
creased the duties an additional 30 percent to a peak of almost 60 percent in 
1932, as shown in figure 10.1. In  all, the effective tariff went up nearly 50 
percent in the early 1930s, sufficient to raise the relative price of imports by 
about 15 percent and reduce import volume by  about 12-17  percent (ceteris 
paribus). 
If  the economic contraction was primarily responsible for the precipitous 
drop in imports, what accounts for the roughly equal drop in export volume 
between 1930 and 1932? (Fig. 10.2 shows that both exports and imports-as 
percentages of GNP-fell  sharply in the early 1930s, with little change in the 
balance of  trade.) The symmetric decline in U.S. exports could have  been 
brought about by declining foreign demand due to (1) the inability of foreign 
countries to earn dollars from exports to the United States, (2)  declining for- 
eign incomes due to the Great Depression abroad, or (3) higher foreign tariffs 
and other trade restrictions. Smoot-Hawley has been blamed for bringing on 
these higher foreign trade barriers and for exacerbating world trade tensions. 
Three explanations  have been proposed for how U.S. policy relates to higher 
C 
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Source; U.S. Department of Commerce,  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Historical Statistics of  the 
United States, from  Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975). 337  From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
tariffs abroad: Smoot-Hawley may have (i) spawned direct retaliatory measures 
against the United States, (ii) signaled a breakdown in policy discipline and 
triggered tariff increases as other countries followed the U.S. example, or (iii) 
had no impact on foreign tariffs, which increased for the same domestic politi- 
cal economy reasons that U.S.  tariffs were raised. To  some degree, all three 
factors were at work. As Jones (1934) has documented, Canada, Spain, and 
Switzerland provide the clearest examples of countries that retaliated with spe- 
cific, discriminatory tariffs against U.S.  product^.^  The League of  Nations 
stressed the second factor, arguing that Smoot-Hawley “was the signal for an 
outburst of tariff-making activity in other countries, partly at least by  way  of 
reprisals” (1933, 193). Finally, Eichengreen (1989) argues that purely domes- 
tic considerations would have  led to higher tariffs in Britain and elsewhere, 
even if  Congress had not passed Smoot-Hawley. A somewhat impressionistic 
reading of the evidence (consistent with Eichengreen’s 1989 conclusion) sug- 
gests that factors ii and iii were the most important, with factor iii probably the 
dominant one. 
At any rate, the international economic climate in  1932 was dramatically 
different from what it had been in 1929. World trade volume fell 26 percent 
and  world  industrial production plummeted 32 percent between  1929 and 
1932. Widespread protectionism-in  the form of tariffs, import quotas, for- 
eign exchange restrictions, and the like-materialized  ovemight.’O What was 
the response of  the Hoover administration to these developments? Through 
1931 and 1932, the response on the trade policy front was inaction: no solu- 
tions were offered, and no major change in course was considered. 
10.3  The Democratic Response: The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
of 1934 
The election of  1930 handed the Democrats control of the House and, with 
the aid of progressive Republicans, a working majority in the Senate on trade 
issues. This provided the Democrats with their first chance since the Wilson 
administration to change the course of U.S. trade policy. 
Democrats and progressive Republicans joined  forces behind the Collier 
bill, introduced in January 1932. Disillusioned by  the way  the flexible tariff 
provision had been employed simply to raise tariffs during the 1920s, Demo- 
crats and progressive Republicans sought to deprive the president of the ability 
to make adjustments in tariff rates and to give Congress that authority instead. 
The bill  also authorized the president to undertake negotiations with other 
countries to reduce tariffs. While this is evidence of congressional sentiment 
in favor of tariff bargaining, any agreement would still require Senate approval. 
9. See the detailed study of  Canada’s reaction to Smoot-Hawley by  McDonald, O’Brien, and 
10. The figures are from League of Nations (1934, 45). On the spread of protectionism across 
Callahan (1996). 
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The Collier bill passed the House in a partisan vote, 100 percent of Demo- 
crats in favor, and 94 percent of Republicans  against. The Senate later approved 
the measure by a similarly partisan vote, whereupon it was promptly vetoed by 
President Hoover in May  1932. In his veto message, Hoover stated that there 
has “never been a time in the history of the United States when tariff protection 
was  more essential to the welfare of  the American people than at present” 
(1977,205-7). The tariff was “solely a domestic question” and economic con- 
ditions made its maintenance “imperative.” An international conference was 
inappropriate  because it might lead to the “abandonment of essential  American 
policies.” Hoover also objected to the elimination of presidential authority over 
the flexible tariff. 
Democrats got a better opportunity to put their mark on tariff policy when 
they were swept into power in the election of  1932. The Democratic platform 
and candidate Franklin Roosevelt had criticized the Smoot-Hawley tariff dur- 
ing the election campaign and proposed reciprocal trade agreements with other 
countries. In view of  the high unemployment rate, however, Roosevelt also 
promised not to strip away protection for American industry. Despite Roose- 
velt’s equivocations over tariff policy, his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, was 
staunchly in favor of lower tariffs through international negotiations and was 
the main force behind the RTAA. 
10.3.1  Formulating the RTAA 
Had they come to power in ordinary circumstances, the Democrats might 
simply have enacted a unilateral tariff reduction as they had done in  1913. 
Some Democrats proposed just this. In August 1931, for example, Sen. Ken- 
neth McKellar (D-Tenn.) suggested repealing the Smoot-Hawley tariff and en- 
acting an immediate, across-the-board tariff cut of 25 percent. A draft speech 
for Roosevelt prepared by Cordell Hull in September 1932  contemplated slash- 
ing tariffs unilaterally by  10 percent and then negotiating further reductions 
(see Tasca 1938, 14; Haggard 1988, 106). 
But the economic situation in 1933  differed from that in 19 13 on two dimen- 
sions and prevented this course of action. First, the U.S. economy was in the 
depths of  the depression. Most Democrats wanted lower tariffs, but in the 
midst  of  high  unemployment and  stagnant output they  could  not  muster 
the political support to seriously consider a unilateral tariff cut.” Second, for- 
eign tariffs escalated sharply during 1930-32 and had been supplemented with 
quantitative restrictions and exchange controls. Table 10.1 shows how tariffs 
in the major U.S. export markets increased during this period. While Smoot- 
Hawley might have spawned some of those barriers, a repeal of Smoot-Hawley 
was not going to eliminate them. 
Thus, the domestic and foreign economic situations together undercut the 
case for unilateral action. Many feared that a repeal of Smoot-Hawley would 
11. Hull later wrote that  “it  would have been folly to go to Congress and ask that the Smoot- 
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Table 10.1  Average Tariff of Major U.S. Trade Partners, Selected Years 
Share of  RTAA 
US. Exports  Country 



















26.1  23.3  27.4  15.7  J 
4.3  9.9  23.1  35.7  J 
6.3  7.9  23.8  7.3 
9.3  5.5  5.4  3.2 
9.2  8.7  17.5  10.9  J 
17.6  18.8  28.8  23.6 
7.4  6.7  23.5  7.9 
17.9  22.4  41.2  18.6 
0.4  2.1  4.7  4.8  J 
Sources: Figures are not comparable across countries. For Canada, figures are average tariff ap- 
plied to U.S. imports (tariff revenue divided by  dutiable imports from the United States) from 
Government of Canada, Canada Year Book (Ottawa, various issues). For other countries, average 
tariff is defined as tariff revenue divided by total imports from Mitchell (1983, 1992, 1995). US. 
export data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign  Trade and Navigation of  the  United 
States, 1928 (Washington, D.C., 1929). 
be contractionary unless opportunities were created for increasing U.S. ex- 
ports. Entrenched foreign trade barriers, it was believed, could be reduced only 
through negotiation. Some business groups also began to coalesce behind the 
principle of reciprocal tariff reductions. As a result, there was virtually no sen- 
timent in Congress for unilateral tariff reduction and much greater support 
for reciprocity. 
In April 1933, President Roosevelt announced his intention to request nego- 
tiating authority from the Congress to undertake tariff reduction agreements 
with other countries. Secretary of State Hull departed for the London Monetary 
and Economic Conference in June with the expectation that such negotiating 
authority would be forthcoming and that he could make substantive tariff re- 
duction proposals. In London, Hull quickly discovered two things. 
First, the administration had decided to postpone its request for negotiating 
authority to concentrate on passage of  the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) through Congress. Roose- 
velt’s  political advisors feared that adding ambitious trade legislation to the 
Hundred Days agenda might overload Congress and  jeopardize the timely pas- 
sage of the domestic components of the New Deal. As a result, though dele- 
gates in London proposed him as chairman of a committee on trade barriers, 
Hull “promptly declined because the American delegation had been stripped 
of any real authority to function in this field” (1948, 1:258). 
Second, there was, at any rate, no support for a multilateral tariff reduction 
conference among the London participants. As Hull put it: 
In earlier years I had been in favor of  any action or agreement that would 
lower tariff barriers, whether the agreement was multilateral . .  .  regional . . . 
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fest that public support in no country, especially our own, would at that 
time support a worth-while multilateral undertaking. My  associates and I 
therefore agreed that we should try to secure the enactment of the next best 
method of  reducing trade barriers, that  is, by  bilateral trade agreements 
which embraced the most-favored-nation policy in its unconditional form- 
meaning a policy of nondiscrimination and equality of  treatment. (1948, 
1:356) 
The administration finally put forth its proposal in early March 1934. The 
president  requested  negotiating  authority  to  reduce  U.S.  tariffs  in  trade 
agreements that would not require congressional approval. Roosevelt stated 
“that a full and permanent domestic recovery depends in part upon a revived 
and strengthened international trade and that American exports cannot be per- 
manently increased without a corresponding increase in imports” (quoted in 
Tasca 1938, which reproduces the text of Roosevelt’s message). 
The contrast between the House Ways  and Means consideration of  the 
RTAA (the final provisions of which will be discussed shortly) and of Smoot- 
Hawley could not be starker: in 1929 the committee heard 1,13  1 witness (none 
from the executive branch) over 43 days, generating 11,200 pages of published 
testimony (plus index) in 18 volumes; in  1934 the committee heard from 17 
witnesses (7 from the administration) over 5 days, in testimony amounting to 
479 pages in 1 volume. While the 173 pages of Smoot-Hawley legislation took 
18 months to work its way through Congress, the RTAA’s 3 pages took just 4 
months (Schnietz 1994; Congressional Record 1930, 72, pt. 10:  10761). Like 
Smoot-Hawley, however, passage of  the RTAA  was almost strictly partisan. 
The House approved the bill on 20 March with 96 percent of the Democrats 
voting in favor, 98 percent of Republicans voting against. The Senate approved 
the measure in early June with 93 percent of Democrats in favor, 85 percent of 
Republicans opposed. Roosevelt signed it on 12 June. 
Cordell Hull later recalled that “in both House and Senate we were aided by 
the severe reaction of public opinion against the Smoot-Hawley Act” (1948, 
1:357). The notion that the passage of the RTAA constituted a repudiation of 
Smoot-Hawley by Congress persists to this day. But the passage of the RTAA 
did not reflect a change in the underlying tariff preferences of individual politi- 
cians, just a change in the partisan composition of Congress, namely, the Dem- 
ocratic majority. By  examining the votes of  all members of  Congress who 
voted on both Smoot-Hawley and the RTAA, Schnietz (1994) clearly demon- 
strates that Congress did not “learn” that the Smoot-Hawley tariff was bad. 
The learning hypothesis implies that members who voted for Smoot-Hawley 
later regretted its harmful consequences and voted for the RTAA. But only 6 
of the 178 House members who voted on both measures demonstrate this type 
of  learning, and all were Democrats. No House Republican who voted for 
Smoot-Hawley also voted  in favor of  the RTAA.’* Whether the electorate 
“learned” to prefer the tariff  views  of  the Democrats is doubtful because 
12. Of the 47 senators who voted on both bills, only 2 Democrats and  1 Republican ‘‘learned.’’ 341  From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Smoot-Hawley played an insignificant role in the Democrats’ electoral success 
in 1930 and 1932. 
The RTAA, which was technically an amendment to Smoot-Hawley, had the 
following provisions: 
The president was authorized to enter into tariff agreements with foreign 
countries. 
The president could proclaim an increase or a decrease in import duties by 
no more than 50 percent but could not transfer any article between the duti- 
able and free lists. 
The proclaimed duties would apply to imports from all countries on an un- 
conditional MFN basis. 
The president’s authority to enter into foreign trade agreements would expire 
in three years. 
Any agreement could be terminated after three years with six months’ notice; 
otherwise, it would survive indefinitel~.‘~ 
The  most  important  change  from  previous  legislation was  that  Congress 
waived its approval of the agreements. Congress also explicitly endorsed the 
unconditional MFN clause, under which tariff reductions negotiated with one 
country would be automatically extended to others. 
On the House floor a key amendment was offered to the president’s proposal 
that served to ensure ongoing congressional influence over trade policy. While 
the president had proposed (with the concurrence of the Ways and Means Com- 
mittee) no time limit to his negotiating authority, the House instead chose to 
limit that authority to three years, after which it would automatically terminate 
without renewal by  Congress. This feature of  the RTAA  strengthened Con- 
gress’s hand because the threat of  nonrenewal of negotiating authority would 
keep the executive branch politically sensitive to the legislature’s concerns. 
Had this provision not been added, a two-thirds majority of both houses of 
Congress would have  been required to override a presidential veto of  a bill 
stripping away his negotiating authority. 
Unlike Smoot-Hawley, Congress’s consideration of the RTAA attracted vir- 
tually no participation by  interest  group^.'^ Haggard reasons that “in contrast 
to 1930 . . .  when interest groups were the main protagonists and specific tariff 
rates the issue, the most important issues at stake in 1934 were institutional, 
centering on the transfer of authority from Congress to the executive” (1988, 
112). The RTAA was simply enabling legislation, and no one knew how  the 
authority would be used, how successful the negotiations would be, or how 
extensive the agreements might be. When the RTAA  was passed, Congress 
could  not  anticipate how  important the legislation would become or even 
whether it would be sustained by future Congresses. In view of the many short- 
13. The complete text of the RTAA is in Tasca (1938, 306-8). 
14. For this reason, Pastor writes that it is “not surprising that there are few interest group 
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lived trade policy experiments of  the past three decades, it was not obvious 
that the RTAA would necessarily bring a lasting, durable change in U.S. trade 
policy making. Perhaps this accounts for the minimal participation of interest 
groups, even among export associations, in the RTAA’s passage. 
Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast (1997) and Schnietz (1994) interpret the 
RTAA as being an institutional mechanism cleverly designed by the Democrats 
to lock in their preferred tariff le~e1.I~  By making reciprocal tariff reductions 
via the RTAA rather than a treaty, only half of Congress (rather than two-thirds) 
was needed to enact lower tariffs. If the RTAA succeeded in reducing tariffs, 
it also would constrain future (Republican) politicians from easily reversing 
the policy since it was made in the context of a foreign trade agreement. With 
hindsight this interpretation rings true, but the RTAA’s  success was not guaran- 
teed. The RTAA could easily have been reversed by the Republicans had they 
been returned to power, and until the early 1940s they explicitly vowed in their 
party platform to halt and perhaps reverse any tariff changes brought about by 
the RTAA. (Section 10.4 will discuss the emergence of the postwar consensus 
in favor of the RTAA.) 
10.3.2  Implementing the RTAA 
During the first year of the RTAA, Secretary of State Hull’s most important 
battles were conducted within the administration. According to Hull, “The 
greatest threat to the trade agreements program came not from foreign coun- 
tries, not from the Republicans, not from certain manufacturers or growers, but 
from within the Roosevelt administration itself, in the person of  George N. 
Peck, former chief of the AM’  (1948, 1:370), who in 1934 became the presi- 
dent’s foreign trade adviser (operating outside the State Department). Peck was 
not alone within the administration in viewing lower tariffs as conflicting with 
New Deal programs aiming to promote domestic economic recovery by raising 
prices. In fact, the NIRA and AAA gave the president the authority to block 
imports that interfered with this objective.16 
The State Department consolidated its control over trade policy after Peck 
resigned in November  1935. That State, rather than other agencies such as 
the Commerce Department, was the locus of trade negotiations proved to be 
important. Led by a staunch supporter of freer trade, Hull’s State Department 
was more insulated from domestic economic interests than other agencies and 
was  able  to  focus  on  the  diplomatic  and  economic  benefits  of  trade 
 agreement^.'^ 
15. See also Nelson (1989) for a discussion of the domestic political sources of the changes in 
U.S. trade policy during this period. 
16. Peck was also a sharp critic of unconditional MFN, which he called “unilateral economic 
disarmament” for fear it would lead to free-riding by other countries. 
17. Haggard notes that “giving the State Department a central role in trade policy introduced 
broader international economic and political considerations onto the policy agenda while provid- 
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An interagency committee (dominated by the State Department but also in- 
cluding the USTC and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Trea- 
sury) oversaw the trade agreements program. Once the committee announced 
its intent to negotiate with a particular country, time was set aside to receive 
public comment, usually from exporters wishing for certain foreign tariffs to 
be reduced or domestic producers worried about U.S. tariff cuts on certain 
commodities. In the negotiations the United States would offer not across-the- 
board horizontal tariff  reductions but  specific tariff  cuts on  a product-by- 
product basis. This selective approach was to be pursued, according to the 
RTAA,  “in  accordance  with  the  characteristics  and  needs  of  the  various 
branches of  American production.” To mitigate the problem of  “free-riding” 
by other countries, tariffs would be reduced only on commodities in which the 
negotiating country was a “principal supplier.” 
The United States had mixed results in bringing other countries to the bar- 
gaining table during the 1930s. Table 10.1 lists the largest U.S. export markets 
prior to the depression. By 1936 agreements had been reached with only three 
of  those countries: Canada (America’s largest trading partner), France, and the 
Netherlands. Germany had requested negotiations, but the United States re- 
fused because of Germany’s discriminatory trade practices (such as barter ar- 
rangements with southeastern Europe). Japan, Argentina, and Australia ex- 
pressed no interest in negotiating, and talks with Italy broke down. 
The United States also approached Britain, the second largest foreign mar- 
ket for U.S. goods, in search of a trade agreement. Britain was unenthusiastic; 
it had just established a higher tariff with colonial preferences, and the United 
States took just 6 percent of  British exports. As war approached in Europe, 
however, Britain saw diplomatic advantages to signing an agreement. The re- 
sult, in Rooth’s words, was “a limited and unspectacular treaty, produced by 
difficult and protracted negotiations” (1992,303). Furthermore, it was in effect 
for less than a year before Britain entered World War I1 in late 1939. 
By  1940, the United States had signed agreements with 21 nations that ac- 
counted for over 60 percent of U.S. trade. (Table 10.2 lists the countries with 
which the United States signed trade agreements.) How extensively did these 
Table 10.2  Reciprocal Trade Agreements, 193&39 
Year When Treaty 








Belgium, Haiti, Sweden 
Brazil, Colombia, Canada, Finland, France, Guatemala, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador 
Czechoslovakia, Ecuador 
United Kingdom 
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trade agreements reduce the average U.S. tariff? As reported in Tasca (1938, 
188 ff.), the USTC calculated the duties that would have been collected in 1934 
had the tariff resulting from the first 13 country agreements implemented by 
1936 been in effect. This fixed-weight measure indicates a decline in the aver- 
age ad valorem tariff from 46.7 percent to 40.7 percent, a 13 percent drop, not 
much more than half of the Smoot-Hawley increase. The extent of  the tariff 
reductions varied  substantially across commodities. By  far the largest cuts 
were concentrated in the “spirits, wines, and other beverages” category of the 
tariff schedule, with almost no reductions in textile tariffs. 
Another calculation over a slightly longer time period yields a tariff reduc- 
tion on the same order of magnitude. As measured by the ratio of tariff revenue 
to dutiable imports, the average ad valorem tariff declined from 46.7 percent 
in 1934 to 37.3 percent in 1939. This amounts to a 20 percent reduction in the 
average tariff, pushing it just below its pre-Smoot-Hawley  level of 40.1 per- 
cent in 1929. Only part of this reduction is due to the RTAA. Import prices 
rose 11 percent between 1934 and 1939 and reduced the ad valorem equivalent 
of the specific duties that had been nominally fixed in the Smoot-Hawley  tariff. 
Using Irwin’s (1996) estimate of the elasticity of the average tariff with respect 
to import prices of -0.64,  higher import prices reduced the tariff by 7.1 percent 
(or 3.3 percentage points). This calculation implies that the RTAA reduced the 
tariff by  12.8 percent, quite close to the USTC’s estimate of  13 percent. As a 
result, negotiated tariff reductions (as opposed to higher import prices) ac- 
counted for two-thirds of the overall tariff cut during 1934-39. 
What was the impact of this tariff cut on U.S. imports, the pattern of U.S. 
trade, and the economic recovery from the depression? If  lower tariffs were 
fully passed through to import prices, the tariff reduction attributable to the 
RTAA would have reduced the relative price of imports by 4 percent, sufficient 
to increase the volume of  imports by  about 3.3 percent (given Irwin’s  1998 
estimate of the price elasticity of import demand of -0.8).  The actual volume 
of imports rose 25 percent during 1934-39, so the RTAA apparently made just 
a modest contribution to the recovery of  trade after 1933. There is some evi- 
dence in Tasca (1938, 265 ff.)  and elsewhere that the pattern of  U.S. trade 
shifted toward countries with whom trade agreements had been signed. There 
is no evidence that trade was a particularly strong component of the economic 
recovery. The contribution of net exports to real economic growth after 1933, 
for example, was often negative. 
10.4  Perpetuating the RTAA: Political Consensus and the 
Postwar Order 
Republicans voted overwhelmingly against the RTAA in 1934. Fearing the 
unraveling of protective tariffs and the loss of congressional  control over trade 
policy, Republicans  raised economic and constitutional  questions about the act. 
They complained that any move to reduce tariffs would jeopardize the ongoing 
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unconstitutional  delegation of legislative taxation powers to the executive. Sen. 
Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.) called the RTAA  “fascist” for giving the presi- 
dent the ability to tax imports. The Republican platform of  1936 vowed  to 
“repeal the present reciprocal trade agreement law,” deeming it “destructive” 
for “flooding our markets with foreign commodities” and “dangerous” for en- 
tailing  secret negotiations without legislative approval. Republicans voted 
overwhelmingly against renewing the RTAA in 1937 (New  York Rmes, 3 Janu- 
ary 1934, 8; Isaacs 1948,258-59). 
By  1940, however, the Republican position had softened. That year’s plat- 
form, which endorsed “genuine” reciprocity agreements, did not call for the 
repeal of the RTAA. Rather, it condemned the RTAA for operating “without 
adequate hearings, with undue haste, without proper consideration of our do- 
mestic producers, and without congressional  approval” (quoted in Isaacs 1948, 
267). Still, Republicans voted overwhelmingly against the 1940 renewal, with 
96 percent of  House and  100 percent of  Senate Republicans against it. In a 
show of wartime unity, a majority of Republicans  supported a two-year renewal 
of  the RTAA  in  1943, but World War  I1 had  effectively brought the trade 
agreements program to a standstill. During 1940-43,  new  agreements with 
Argentina, Mexico, Iran, Peru, and Uruguay (and supplementary agreements 
with Canada and Cuba) were signed, and during 1943-45 a single accord (with 
Iceland) was reached. These agreements did not entail significant tariff reduc- 
tions, and none had a major impact on trade. 
The biggest question facing the RTAA in 1945 was its postwar survival. The 
president’s negotiating authority, necessary to complete the ambitious postwar 
plans for international commercial policies, expired in mid- 1945. In addition, 
the 50 percent maximum reduction in tariffs specified in the original 1934 act 
had been made on over 40 percent of dutiable imports (USTC 1948, pt. 2: 14). 
President Roosevelt sought the authority to reduce tariffs another 50 percent 
over the next three years. Republicans again tried to restrict the president’s 
powers.  Pastor notes that the House leadership helped defeat “twelve differ- 
ent amendments which would have given Congress veto power, reduced or 
eliminated the new authority, or help several special interests” (1980, 95). In 
the House, the final vote was again largely along party lines: 95 percent of 
Democrats favored renewal, while 8 1 percent of Republicans were opposed. 
In the Senate, the 88 percent of Democrats in favor were joined by a surprising 
43 percent of Republicans. Irwin and Kroszner (1997) find that this Republican 
support came from senators in states with an above average export orientation 
of producers. A bipartisan bloc in favor of the RTAA was beginning to emerge. 
Unlike plans for the international monetary system, postwar international 
trade arrangements materialized slowly. The United States aimed to convert 
18. The Republican platform of 1944 announced that the party would cooperate in “removal of 
unnecessary and destructive barriers to international trade,” but that it wanted to “maintain [a] fair 
protective tariff. . . so that the standard of living of our people shall not be impaired” and that the 
tariff should be modified “only by reciprocal bilateral trade agreements approved by Congress” 
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the piecemeal, bilateral RTAA approach into a broader, multilateral process. In 
November 1945, the State Department circulated the document “Proposals for 
Expansion of  World Trade and Employment,” which envisioned an  Interna- 
tional Trade Organization (ITO) having wide-ranging authority over global 
commerce, including trade policy, cartels, commodity agreements, employ- 
ment, economic development, and international investment. Negotiations to 
finalize the IT0  charter took another two and a half years, and while the United 
Nations eventually approved the charter in 1948, it proved stillborn due to lack 
of U.S. support. (In 1950, the Truman administration finally decided that the 
IT0 would not be submitted for congressional approval.) 
The commercial policy articles of the IT0  charter, however, were negotiated 
and finalized in Geneva between April and October 1947 and resulted in the 
GATT. The GATT set out the principles governing the trade policy of signatory 
countries, including first and foremost unconditional MFN treatment for all 
GATT signatories. The agreement also embodied tariff reductions negotiated 
by the 23 participating countries. The tariff negotiations were conducted on a 
bilateral, product-by-product basis (using the  principal supplier rule). The 
lower negotiated rates were then generalized to other participants via the MFN 
clause and considered bound at those rates. In the case of  the United States, 
these tariff reductions became effective on 1 January 1948 and did not require 
congressional approval. 
How extensive were the tariff reductions introduced by the first GATT nego- 
tiating round at Geneva? The USTC (1948, 19) calculated that had the Geneva 
duties been in effect in 1947, the average ad valorem rate on dutiable imports 
would have been 15.3, instead of the actual 19.4, amounting to a 21.1 percent 
tariff reduction. But higher import prices brought an additional reduction by 
lowering the ad valorem equivalent of specific duties. Import prices rose 10.5 
percent between 1947 and 1948, which would have reduced the tariff by about 
7.0 percent, according to Irwin’s (1996) calculations. So in  this one pivotal 
year, fully one-third of  the total U.S. tariff reduction-from  19.4 percent in 
1947 to 13.9 percent in 1948-was  due to higher import prices. 
Remarkably, the immediate postwar trade liberalization of the United States 
effectively ended with the Geneva agreement in  1947. The Geneva negotia- 
tions were followed up  by  negotiating rounds  at Annecy  (1949), Torquay 
(1950-51),  and Geneva again (1955-56),  which resulted in additions to the 
GATT club but negligible tariff reductions (about 2.5 percent in each round, 
on average). The Dillon Round (1961-62)  also accomplished little. Not until 
the Kennedy Round, initiated in 1962 (but not completed until 1967) owing to 
US.  concerns about the impact of the European Economic Community on its 
exports, was there another significant reduction in U.S. tariffs through multilat- 
eral negotiations.I9 
19. According to Koch, “An important factor [behind the passivity during the late  1940s and 
through the 1950~1  was the growing protectionism in the United States. . . . There was a feeling 
that the United States had given away concessions without any real corresponding benefit, as the 
European countries were slow in eliminating their discrimination against dollar goods” (1969, 82, 347  From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
But the U.S.  tariff wall had been breached: the average ad valorem tariff, 
which stood at 59 percent in 1932, was just  12 percent by  1954. The average 
tariff had been reduced by 80 percent. Yet only about 29 percent of this reduc- 
tion  can  be  attributed to  lower  tariff  rates  arising  from  negotiated trade 
agreements. The silent and gradual erosion of specific duties (last set in nomi- 
nal terms by  the Smoot-Hawley duties in  1930) by  inflation was the over- 
whelming source of the reduction in tariffs. This finding does not imply that 
the RTAA  and subsequent GATT agreements were irrelevant. Although U.S. 
tariffs  would  have  declined  significantly  in  the  absence  of  any  trade 
agreements, the RTAA-GATT mechanism raised the cost of possible congres- 
sional action to unravel these de facto reductions. 
The RTAA mechanism formally bound the tariffs at lower levels against the 
temptation to raise them. But what really ensured the sanctity of  the lower 
tariffs was that Republicans, even after having won control of  Congress in the 
1946 election, now accepted the trade agreements program and allowed the 
Geneva negotiations that created the GATT to continue. Early in 1947, Rep. 
Thomas Jenkins (R-Ohio) of  the Ways  and Means Committee introduced a 
resolution to halt the Geneva negotiations until the USTC had studied the im- 
pact of lower tariffs on U.S. industry. Two senior Republican senators (includ- 
ing Arthur Vandenberg, who had earlier called the RTAA fascist) reached an 
agreement with the State Department in which the Jenkins resolution would 
be killed in exchange for an “escape clause” that would establish procedures 
allowing domestic industries to obtain relief from import competition. Presi- 
dent  Truman  issued  an  executive  order  stating  that  in  all  future  trade 
agreements, the United States could withdraw or modify concessions ‘‘if, as a 
result of unforeseen developments and of the concession granted by the United 
States on any article in the trade agreement, such article is being imported in 
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause, or threaten, 
serious injury to domestic producers of  like or similar articles” (quoted in 
Leddy and Norwood 1963, 127).20  This language was included as Article 19 of 
the GATT.  Republicans accommodated, to a limited extent, special interests 
adversely affected by  lower tariffs but also implicitly accepted the past and 
future tariff reductions as a fait accompli. 
Thus, in  their one big opportunity to halt the continuation of  the  trade 
agreements program into the postwar period, the Republicans balked. Yet, al- 
though the Geneva negotiations were allowed to proceed unchallenged, the 
Republicans did bring a screeching halt to further tariff reductions and addi- 
tional trade agreements. The Republican Congress extended presidential nego- 
tiating authority in  1948 for just one year.  Included in the renewal was the 
84) and had failed to dismantle their colonial preferences as well. Also see Irwin (1995) for a 
discussion of the early GATT rounds. 
20. The escape clause was used sparingly between 1947 and 1951. Twenty-one applications for 
import relief were received, resulting in just two tariff increases (on women’s fur felt hats and hat 
bodies and on hatters’ fur) because most applications were dismissed after preliminary investiga- 
tions (Leddy and Norwood 1963, 128). 348  Douglas A. Irwin 
“peril point” provision, which required the USTC to calculate the protection 
necessary to prevent serious injury to domestic producers. (Although the presi- 
dent was not required to act on this information, if tariffs were cut below this 
level he would have to provide Congress with an explanation.) In 1949, a new 
Democratic Congress repealed the previous extension with its peril point pro- 
vision and enacted a new (retroactive) three-year extension of negotiating au- 
thority. Like the prewar pattern, these congressional votes were largely parti- 
san,  although  an  increasing  number  of  Republicans  were  supporting the 
Democrats. 
By the early 1950s, the partisan division over trade policy had largely evapo- 
rated.*I A Democratic Congress in  1951 extended RTAA  authority for two 
years but accepted the Republican idea of peril points and required the USTC 
to investigate injury complaints caused by concessions in trade agreements.22 
A Republican Congress in 1953 extended negotiating authority, but just for a 
single year in exchange for President Eisenhower’s pledge not to pursue further 
trade agreements. These votes were largely bipartisan: both parties endorsed 
the principle of executive leadership on trade matters by continuing to extend 
presidential negotiating authority, although now always with safeguards for 
domestic import-competing producers. Neither party seriously considered re- 
versing the existing tariff reductions, but they were also content to bring a 
pause to further trade liberalizati~n.~~ 
Why did the 80 percent tariff reduction over two decades, which would have 
been unthinkable in the mid-l930s,  survive so easily in the postwar period? 
Several reasons can be given. 
Public opinion was not hostile to the new approach to trade policy. In May 
1945, a survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion found that when 
informed voters were asked whether the trade agreements program should be 
continued, 75 percent answered yes, 7 percent answered no, and 18 percent 
were uncertain. Asked whether it was good to reduce U.S. tariffs under the 
trade agreements program, 57 percent said yes, 20 percent said no, and 23 
percent were uncertain (see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, 81 ff.). Despite the 
usual caveats that come to mind when considering public opinion polling, vir- 
tually all polls during the late 1940s and early 1950s show a clear majority in 
favor of lower tariffs in the context of reciprocal trade agreements. 
Such favorable public sentiment reflected the fact that powerful economic 
21. Watson (1956) analyzes congressional voting on trade bills during this period and finds that 
regional patterns replaced partisan ones. 
22. Meeting  with congressional leaders shortly after his election, however, President Eisen- 
hower found that some Republicans “even hoped we could restore the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, 
a move which I knew would he ruinous” (Eisenhower 1963, 195). 
23. Congress was also suspicious of the GATT. In every renewal of negotiating authority during 
the  1950s (1951, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1958), Congress included the following disclaimer: “The 
enactment of this Act shall not be construed to determine or indicate the approval or disapproval 
by the Congress of the Executive Agreement known as the  General Agreement on Tariffs and 
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interests-both  business and  labor groups-had  swung behind  the RTAA. 
This was not altogether evident from looking at the pro-protection share of 
oral and written testimony at congressional hearings, which remained roughly 
constant at 80 percent through late 1940s through 1950s, according to Verdier 
(1994,210).  But the many narrow industry interests against lower tariffs (such 
as milk, mushroom, and wool producers) belied the widespread support for 
lower tariffs among much larger organizations. In 1945, major labor organiza- 
tions, such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (representing over 6 
million workers),  the United Automobile and Aircraft Workers, the Textile 
Workers’  Union  of  America,  and  the Amalgamated Clothing Workers  of 
America, supported extension of the RTAA. Business groups did as well, in- 
cluding the Chamber of  Commerce, the American Farm Bureau Federation, 
and the American Bankers Association. With European and Asian economies 
devastated by  war,  these groups were poised to benefit from greater exports 
and thus supported an open world trading system. 
And although European and Japanese industries began to recover soon after 
the end of  the war, trade liberalization entailed very small economic costs in 
terms of labor displacement due to import competition. Imports as a percent- 
age of GNP in the United States rose from 2.3 percent in 1946 to 3.1 percent 
in  1950 and remained at this level through the 1950s. During the high-tariff 
period of  the  1920s, by  contrast, imports had been at 4.5 percent of  GNP. 
Meanwhile, exports accounted for 4.5 percent of GNP throughout 1950s. On 
mercantilist grounds, politicians found freer trade to be a “winning” policy. 
In addition, as the cold war intensified, support for freer trade with Western 
Europe and other allies dovetailed with the US. national security agenda. 
Lower tariffs and open markets, like military aid and the Marshall Plan, were 
linked to American national security and the containment of communism. The 
change of heart of  Arthur Vandenburg epitomized the Republican shift: once 
the high-tariff isolationist of  the 1930s who called the RTAA  fascist, he be- 
came the anticommunist internationalist of the 1940s who accepted lower tar- 
iffs as part of the fight for democracy and economic recovery in 
Along with changes in underlying economic interests, foreign policy consider- 
ations muted postwar Republican opposition to the RTAA. 
It would be completely misleading to conclude that Congress, through its 
repeated delegation of trade powers to the president, abdicated any role in the 
formation of trade policy. Although Congress never again wrote the tariff code 
that set rates of import duty, it influenced the agenda by keeping the president 
on a short negotiating authority leash and enacting various forms of procedural 
escape clauses that were expanded over the postwar period. 
24. Verdier notes that “economic isolationism was discredited and fell into such disarray that 
the Republican-prudently,  it turned out-decided  to eschew a frontal attack on the RTA  during 
the renewal of 1948 and confine their attacks instead to procedural matters (peril points and the 
independent Tariff Commission)” (1994, 204); see also Bailey 1997. 350  Douglas A. Irwin 
10.5  Conclusions 
Did the Great Depression constitute a defining moment for U.S. trade pol- 
icy? In view of the sharp and lasting policy changes brought about during the 
1930s, the answer appears to be yes. In  1930, the Congress was firmly in con- 
trol of the tariff; after 1934, the executive largely dominated tariff making. In 
the early 1930s, the average tariff was over 50 percent; by  1939, it was below 
40 percent, and by  1949, it was below 15 percent. 
While the Great Depression did play a role in bringing about these changes, 
a closer study of U.S. trade policy during this period qualifies this conclusion. 
The international nature of the Great Depression gave rise to higher foreign 
trade barriers against U.S. exports, which in turn prompted the executive dele- 
gation feature of the RTAA. Had the depression been confined to the United 
States and foreign tariffs remained low, there may have been no need for an 
RTAA. Once the political prerequisite of  a domestic economic recovery had 
been established, the Democrats could have repealed Smoot-Hawley and en- 
acted additional unilateral tariff cuts (much as they had done after the 1892 
and 1912 elections). They did not do so after 1932 in part because the higher 
foreign barriers gave the United States a greater incentive to abandon its inde- 
pendent tariff policy and engage in bargaining.25 
Although the RTAA was born during the depression, it was not institutional- 
ized until the late 1940s. During World War I1 the Republican position evolved 
from outright opposition to the RTAA to making agreements conditional on 
congressional  approval  and  inclusive  of  safeguards  to  protect  import- 
competing domestic interests. It was not the Great Depression per se but the 
new economic and political position of the United States in the world resulting 
from the war that made a return to Smoot-Hawley virtually unthinkable. This 
facilitated the emergence of a bipartisan consensus in support of the executive 
trade agreements framework. 
Finally, the trade agreements negotiated under the auspices of  the RTAA 
only modestly reduced the level of  U.S. tariffs. Three-quarters of  the post- 
Smoot-Hawley tariff reduction was accomplished through higher import prices 
that eroded specific duties last set in 1930. This reduction would have occurred 
even in the absence of the RTAA as long as the specific duties in the Smoot- 
Hawley tariff remained unchanged. 
25. Lake (1998) discusses the international constraints on U.S. tariff policy during this period, 
and Hillman and Moser (1996) develop a model in which greater political support for trade liberal- 
ization can arise from reciprocal negotiations than from unilateral actions. 351  From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
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